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THE DANISH OMBUDSMAN
BENT C:RISTENSEN

t

Unlike the Swedish Ombudsman, the Danish office of Parliamentary Commissioner is of very recent origin. In 1953, as a part
of a general constitutional revision, the Danish Constitution was
amended to include a section reading: "Legal provision shall be made
for the appointment by Parliament of one or two persons who shall not
be members of Parliament to supervise the civil and military administration of the State." '
On June 11, 1954, the King gave his assent to the Parliamentary
Ombudsman Act,' and on March 29, 1955, Parliament appointed
Stephan Hurwitz, an eminent professor of criminal law, as its first
Ombudsman. Professor Hurwitz has continued in the position since
its creation.
While the Danish institution lacks the antiquity of its Swedish
or even its Finnish counterpart, it has received much more attention
in the English-speaking world than did its predecessors.3 One writer
has suggested that since Denmark, like the common-law democracies,
but unlike Sweden, had no tradition of free inspection of the public
records, the Danish experience might be more instructive to persons
concerned with the development of legal institutions in England and
America."
In the slightly more than six years since the Danish Ombudsman
took office, he has published five annual reports. Thus there is now
material for a tentative evaluation of the Ombudsman's work in a
modem parliamentary democracy where there is no tradition whatever of that special form of control of the executive, and where, in
contrast to the Swedish situation, the institution has been engrafted
onto an extant constitution during an unrevolutionary era.
t Professor of Law, University of Copenhagen.
University of Copenhagen.

Cand. Jur. 1947, Dr. Jur. 1958,

1

DEN. CosT. § 55
2 Act No. 203 of June 11, 1954, Om Folketingets Ombudsmand [hereinafter cited as

Ombudsman Act]. The full text of this act, as amended by Act No. 205 of June 11,
1959 and Act No. 91 of March 16, 1960, appears in Hurwitz, Denmark's Ombudsmiand:
The ParliamentaryCommissioner for Civil and Military Government Administration,
1961 Wis. L. Rxv. 169, app. A at 194.
3 Davis, Ombudsmen in Anmerica: Officers To Criticize Administrative Action,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 1057, 1058 nn. 4-6 (1961); see Abraham, A People's Watchdog
Against Abuse of Power, 20 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 152 (1960).
4 See Blom-Cooper, An Ombudsman in Britain?, 1960 PuB. L. 145, 147-48.
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BACKGROUND

The debates preceding the creation of the office of Ombudsman in
Denmark show that the new office was designed to pursue two objectives in particular.
First, the Ombudsman was to act on behalf of Parliament in relation to the administrative agencies, strengthening the control traditionally exercised by the supreme elective body and its individual members over the ministers and their officials. Such strengthening was
considered necessary because of the growing power and increasing
complexity of the administrative process. Apparently the Ombudsman was expected to perform this function through two kinds of activity: he was to oversee the exercise of the wide quasi-legislative
powers which had been delegated to the Danish government services
during the preceding generation and to propose amendments to existing legislation in order to promote law and order and to improve the
civil service.
Second, the Ombudsman was to be a safeguard of law and order
for the individual, a sort of appellate institution for citizens who
come into conflict with the administrative agencies. In the words of
the parliamentary spokesman of the Labor Party, the Ombudsman
was meant to be "the protector of the man in the street against injustices, against arbitrariness, and against the abuse of power" ' on the
part of the executive.
The second objective was stressed as the more important even
before 1955, and the actual functioning of the office since its creation
has followed this emphasis. In fact, the role of the Ombudsman in
controlling the exercise of delegated legislative power by administrative agencies has been of relatively secondary importance. For,
although the Ombudsman has frequently proposed amendments to
existing legislation, these proposals have usually resulted from his
activities as the protector of individual rights. On the other hand,
the activity of the Ombudsman has become an important supplement
to the existing remedies by which citizens can assert their individual
interests against the administration.
Since the office of Ombudsman is essentially a supplement to and
an extension of already existing agencies of appeal, it goes without
saying that it has been necessary to adjust the activities of the institution to these existing facilities. Thus a general idea of the other
means by which citizens may vindicate their rights and interests under
5 Folketingstidende 1953/54, sp. 5294.
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Danish administrative law is required in order to understand both the
inadequacies which led to the introduction of the Ombudsman and the
scope of the Ombudsman's functions and authority.
Alternative Sources of Relief
Before undertaking a brief survey of some essential aspects of Danish administrative law, it is appropriate to emphasize two of its basic
characteristics. There is no Danish system of administrative courts
with general powers to decide disputes of public law such as exists in
France and Germany, for example. Nor is there a comprehensive
Administrative Procedure Act like that in the United States, although
there are sporadic provisions on the subject in general legislation.
The chief means available to a citizen for challenging a decision by an
administrative agency are appeal to a superior authority or review by
the ordinary courts.
Administrative Appeal
It is a general principle of Danish law, which applies in the
absence of any express provisions, that an appeal may be taken to a
higher authority from any administrative decision. The ultimate level
of appeal is, as a rule, the competent minister. In the last few
decades, however, special agencies of appeal have been set up within
several branches of the administration; these agencies, which are much
like the administrative tribunals of British law in organization and
legal status, are more or less independent of the minister. This general
opportunity for administrative appeal is cheap (more often than not
it is entirely free of charge, legal assistance being rarely required) and
normally speedy; it has the additional advantage that, in principle, the
responsibility for providing the evidence necessary to decide the
appeal rests on the public authority. Moreover, since the agency of
appeal may reconsider the case in its entirety, the scope of review is
not limited by distinctions between discretion and legality, fact and
law, and the like. At the same time, however, the administrative appeal has the serious drawback that the appellate body belongs to the
administration and is, in the eyes of the public, not quite impartial, although this feeling does not extend to certain of the administrative
tribunals.
Judicial Review
The ordinary courts of law also exercise judicial review of administrative action under Danish, as under Anglo-American law. Any
citizen having standing to sue may bring an action against the govern-
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ment, asking that an administrative decision be annulled or modified
and, alternatively or in addition, that damages be awarded. Moreover, by declining to follow the demand of a public agency, the citizen
may compel the agency to institute enforcement proceedings. However, the power of Danish courts to review administrative decisions
is not unlimited. Judicial review is qualified not only by a number
of statutes providing that particular administrative decisions shall
be unreviewable but also by limitations similar to those imposed
on the administrative courts of other continental countries. Thus,
while the distinction between law and fact is irrelevant in review by
the Danish courts, these courts are confined to reviewing the legality of
the administrative action: whether the agency has crossed the bounds
of its statutory authority but not whether it has exercised a sound
or adequate discretion within the scope of the law. These limitations
on the scope of judicial review have not prevented the courts from
overruling administrative decisions in a great many cases or from
exercising a salutary general control.
The inadequacies of judicial control of administrative agencies
which contributed to the introduction of the office of Ombudsman are
different from those connected with the administrative appeal. The
courts enjoy a high reputation for impartiality, but because the courts
adhere to the usual forms of legal procedure in reviewing administrative actions, judicial review is often slow and costly. The expense is
aggravated by the requirement that the citizen provide the evidence to
support his claims and by the usual expedient that he employ counsel
to present his case. Therefore, the number of suits relating to administrative law is very small in proportion to the volume and importance
of the administrative process. Where it operates, the control of the
courts is excellent; its operation, however, is sporadic.
THE OMBUDSMAN AND

His WORK

The Ombudsman is elected by Parliament after every general
election and may be reelected indefinitely. If he no longer commands
the confidence of Parliament, he may be dismissed at any time and
another elected to his position.' In point of fact, however, Professor
Hurwitz has been Ombudsman ever since the establishment of the
office.
Relation to the Parliament
The Ombudsman is by law the mandatory of Parliament and exer7
cises his control over the government services on behalf of that body.
6 Ombudsman Act § 1.
7Ibid.
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The fact that the Ombudsman's authority is derived from Parliament,
which exercises the supreme power in the Danish government, gives
added weight to his opinions about the conduct of government officials-especially of the ministers-and, at the same time, stresses that
he is outside the administration which it is his business to control.
This attachment to Parliament does not imply, however, that the
Ombudsman's relationship to the legislature is one of subordination.
On the contrary, the Ombudsman Act provides for his independence
of Parliament in the discharge of his duties.' Parliament may not
order the Ombudsman to consider a case or to drop a case under
consideration, nor can it dictate the outcome of any investigation by
him. Parliament's sole influence, beyond the power of appointment
and dismissal, is its ability to set general regulations concerning the
Ombudsman's functions.' As a matter of fact, the regulations which
were adopted a year after the appointment of the first Ombudsman 10
serve chiefly to amplify the concise provisions of the Ombudsman Act,
and Parliament has in nowise attempted to tie the Ombudsman's
hands by modifying these regulations.
Qualifications
The Ombudsman may not be a member of Parliament and must
be a graduate in law.11 He is paid according to the salary scale for
judges of the Supreme Court and may be granted an additional allowance.1" The Ombudsman may not engage in any other public or
private employment without the consent of a special parliamentary
committee.' 3
Staff
The Ombudsman engages his own staff. During the past six
years, he has been able to manage with a very small group of
assistants; currently his staff is comprised of one deputy chief, one
senior staff officer, three junior staff officers-all members of the legal
profession-and the necessary clerical employees. The staff is likely to
be maintained at the same modest level in the future.
8

Ombudsman Act § 3.
9Ibid.
10 Instruction No. 109 of March 22, 1956, for folketingets ombudsmand [hereinafter cited as Regulations]. These Regulations are printed in full in Hurwitz, supra
note 2, app. B at 196.
11 Ombudsman Act § 2.
12 Ombudsman Act § 12.
13 Ibid.
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Work Load
Figures are available for the work load carried by the Ombudsman for the last seven months of 1955 and for full years from 1956
through 1959. Over this period, 4,437 complaints were received by
the Ombudsman, of which 1,610 have been taken up for consideration
on the merits. Of these, 204 have been found to afford ground for
criticism and 95 more, although not falling into the former category,
have resulted in representations to the competent authority. While
36% of all complaints received by the Ombudsman up to the end
of 1959 have been considered on their merits, there is a strong trend
toward nonconsideration. Thus in 1955, 56% of all complaints were
considered, while in 1959, fewer than 21%. received similar treatment.
This trend may be the result of a growing ability on the part of the
Ombudsman to recognize those cases which deserve consideration on
the merits rather than of a decreasing willingness to consider complaints, since the percentage of complaints which have led to criticisms
or representations to the competent authorities has remained steadily
at about 7%14
SCOPE OF AUTHORITY

The Ombudsman Act provides that the Ombudsman shall supervise the civil and military services of the state, including all central
and local services, whether exercised by civil servants or not. 15 Parliament and the courts of law are outside the scope of his authority, and
the same applies as yet to the various agencies of municipal government. On the other hand, the ministers come under the supervision
of the Ombudsman when they exercise their functions as heads of government departments.
14 The annual case load of the Ombudsman during the first five years is recorded
Cases affording
in the following table:

Cases

no ground

for criticisnbt

Total no.

No. complaints

consideredon

groundsfor

affording

resultingin repre-

Year

received

their merits

criticism

competent authority

1955
1956

565
869

315
438

25
30

14
15

1957

1,029

384

50

31

complaints

sentationsto the

17
60
292
1,101
1958
18
181
39
873
1959
The figures for 1955 are for the last seven months of the year only. The figures in
the last two columns are not capable of exact comparison with the statistics on the
number of complaints considered on the merits since not all cases taken up in any
one year are closed in the same year. Nevertheless, the table is quite reliable as a
reflection of the volume of the Ombudsman's work.
15 Ombudsman Act §§ 1, 4.
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Comparison to Sweden
In two particulars, the scope of authority of the Danish Ombudsman differs substantially from that of the Swedish archetype. As a
result of a theory of the independence of the courts, court personnel
have been entirely excluded from the concern of the Danish Ombudsman,"8 while in Sweden, control over certain court functions plays
quite an important part in the office. On the other hand, the authority
of the Danish Ombudsman does extend to the ministers, 7 whose activities are beyond the competence of his Swedish counterpart. This
difference is due to the fact that the Danish government, like most
systems of central administration on the European continent, but unlike the Swedish one, has developed in as many hierarchical pyramids
as there are ministers. The authority of the Danish Ombudsman
would have been ineffective had the ministers been left outside his
control, since a minister could always have insulated any matter from
the Ombudsman's authority by making a decision or giving an order
personally.
Supervision of Ministers
The Ombudsman's supervision of the ministers is an actual fact.
Quite a number of cases relate to decisions of various ministers, and
in at least one case published in the reports the Ombudsman has
levelled criticism against a minister. The matter concerned a citizen
who, in connection with a dispute over the proper payment of the duty
on certain goods, claimed that he had applied in person to the Minister
of Finance who, according to the complainant, had promised to accept
his view of the matter. After some time, the citizen sent the Minister
a letter in which he invoked the alleged promise and stated that he
intended to act in accordance with it. The letter went unanswered,
and the Minister subsequently decided the case against the complainant, who then appealed to the Ombudsman. After an investigation, the
Ombudsman was unconvinced that the Minister had made any promise.
He said, however, that the Minister should have answered the citizen's letter so as to correct the apparent misunderstanding. When
informed of the Ombudsman's view of the matter, the Minister refused to admit that the circumstances of the case justified a determination that the misinformation in the citizen's letter should have
been corrected by a reply from the Ministry. The Ombudsman, how16 Ombudsman Act § 1.
17 Ombudsman Act § 4.
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ever, maintained his position, and both views were published in the
1956 Annual Report.'
Other State Officials
Although the ministers are subject to the control of the Ombudsman, his supervision is primarily directed toward civil servants. Moreover, persons other than civil servants and ministers come within the
Ombudsman's sphere of authority if they are attached to the national
government services. For example, members of the numerous administrative tribunals and regulatory commissions of the government
are subject to supervision by the Ombudsman, although they are not
technically civil servants. In his 1955 Report, the Ombudsman even
criticized a member of Parliament who, in his capacity as a member of
such an agency, had decided a case on inadequately verified data and
had disregarded a time-limit.'"
Even those state activities which do not involve the exercise of
public authority come within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
For example, the universities and other institutions of higher education, cultural institutions such as The National Theater, The National
Radio, and museums, the postal service, and the railways come within
the Ombudsman's authority whenever they are operated by the state;
this authority also extends to the supervision of government contracts
for goods and services. The Ombudsman has frequently taken up
cases in these fields.
Local Government
While there is general agreement on the proper limits of the
Ombudsman's sphere of control, the exclusion of local or municipal
government from his supervision has resulted in a great deal of discussion. A large proportion of the total public administration in Denmark is entrusted to elected local councils, their committees, and their
public servants. Viewed from the ideal of protecting the individual,
which was the chief reason for creating the office of Ombudsman, it
may seem both unreasonable and illogical to exclude these agencies
from his control. The illogicality is accentuated by the fact that in
Danish law no clear line can be drawn between municipal and national
government services, and many decisions by municipal authorities are
subject to appeal to national authorities. The implication of the limitations on the Ombudsman's authority in these cases is that, paradoxi18

FOLKETiNGETS OMBUDSMANDS
after cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
19 1955 ANNUAL REPORT 76.

BFERETNING FOR QR.E

1956 s. 76, at 119 [herein-
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cally, the Ombudsman may supervise a review by a national appellate
agency, but not a decision by a municipal agency of first instance. On
the other hand, the subjection of all local government services to the
Ombudsman's supervision would give the Ombudsman day-to-day
control over the conduct of publicly elected officials. That not only
would be contrary to the principle of local self-government, which has
a great popular acceptance in Denmark, but would create a danger that
the Ombudsman might become involved in local party politics.
This discussion for and against extending the Ombudsman's authority to include municipal governments has quite recently resulted
in an amendment to the Ombudsman Act.2 0

The new provision,

which will come into effect on April 1, 1962, represents a compromise
between the need to afford greater protection to the individual and the
desire to respect the peculiar status of local elective bodies. The opportunities for private citizens to complain against municipal action under
the new amendment are rather severely restricted, while the power of
the Ombudsman to investigate municipal action on his own initiative
is much wider. Citizens may complain against municipal action only
in cases for which the law provides an administrative appeal to national
authorities, and even then never when the action has been taken by
the municipal council in pleno. On his own initiative, however, the
Ombudsman may investigate any municipal action which has violated
essential legal interests.
JurisdictionalProblems
Doubts about the delimitation of the Ombudsman's authority occur quite frequently. The lines dividing municipal from national
government services and public from private enterprise have been the
source of special difficulties. The latter distinction is particularly
relevant where government policies are implemented through independent public corporations; many child-care institutions, for example, are independent organizations from a legal point of view, but
their expenses are paid almost entirely from public funds and they are
subject to close supervision by the government. While the Ombudsman has been very reluctant to deal with any administrative services
of a municipal nature, he has quite often included such semi-public
institutions under his supervision.
An exposition of the problems of jurisdiction facing the Ombudsman would be misleading without emphasis of the fact that such problems are somewhat less important to the Ombudsman than to many
20 Act No. 142 of May 17, 1961, Lov om zendringer i lov om folketingets ombudsmand.
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other authorities. Since the principal sanction available to the Ombudsman is that of stating his opinion, even where a case includes
matters outside his sphere of authority he may recount the case in
such a manner as to express more or less indirectly his view on those
aspects of the case which are technically beyond his jurisdiction. Examples of such handling of cases appear occasionally throughout
the reports.
Political Problems,
Since the Ombudsman's jurisdiction extends to the ministers,
there is an obvious risk that the political opposition will try to use the
Ombudsman for political purposes. It is possible, for example, that
the opposition might lodge a complaint with the Ombudsman against
the conduct of a minister on a politically delicate issue. It is of prime
importance to the Ombudsman as an institution that it keep from
becoming involved in the general political struggle. The institution
will survive only if it is accepted by all influential groups as impartial
and unbiased.
In practice, the Ombudsman has managed to avoid becoming a
plaything of political controversy. The treatment of two early cases
which threatened to use the institution for the promotion of particular
political aims may serve as illustrations. Shortly after he had taken
office, an organization of car owners approached the Ombudsman,
requesting a statement on the power of the government to apply
revenue from gasoline and motor vehicle taxes to purposes other
than the construction and maintenance of roads. The Qmbudsman inquired whether various special financial acts had provided for any
use of the funds contrary to the provisions in the permanent taxation
acts and whether the administration had obeyed these special acts.
He found that the agencies had dealt with the funds in conformity
with the special acts but refused to consider whether the legislature
had violated the constitution by amending the general tax legislation
through special acts or whether the legislature should require that the
portion of revenue not used for roads be accumulated in a special
fund for later use and not merely entered into a fictitious special
account in the budget.2 1 Thus, the political aspects of this case were
converted into legal ones, some falling within and others without the
scope of the Ombudsman's authority. The Ombudsman was faced
even more directly with a political question in a case decided about
the same time in which a merchants' association complained that the
Minister of Finance, by overdrawing the government account in the
21 1955 ANNuAL REPORT 57.
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Danish National Bank, was borrowing money contrary to the constitutional requirement that state loans be raised only by statute. Here
the Ombudsman found that the power to overdraw the government
account must be regarded as acknowledged by usage; but he recognized that the amount of overdraft must be subject to a limit. Nevertheless, the Ombudsman observed that "the determination of that
limit being a subject not of legal, but of political considerations, I am
not empowered to express any opinion on the question."
RULES OF PROCEDURE

Commencement of Inquiries
The Ombudsman's Initiative
The Ombudsman may take up any matter for investigation on his
own initiative.2" This may happen, for example, because an issue is
being discussed by the press or as a result of the Ombudsman's own
inspections of the prisons or other institutions. In actual fact, however, very few cases have been initiated by the Ombudsman sua sponte.
Of the approximately 1,100 cases considered on their merits during
the first three years that the office existed, no more than twelve commenced in that fashion. It does not follow, however, that this initiative is without effect; its existence is one of the prerequisites for the
wide discretion which the Ombudsman has in dealing with complaints
by private citizens.
. Complaints From Private Citizens
Section 6 of the Ombudsman Act and article 5 of the Regulations
contain the rules governing the procedure for making complaints to the
Ombudsman. Complaints may be lodged by any person, subject to the
limitations that the complainant must state his name, that the complaint must be in writing and accompanied by evidence where this is
possible, and that it must be filed within one year after the occurrence
of the incident which is alleged.
DiscretionaryPower in the Treatment of Complaints
Mere compliance with these rules of procedure does not guarantee
the complainant that the Ombudsman will consider his complaint on
its merits. Section 6 of the Ombudsman Act gives the Ombudsman
discretion to decide whether a complaint affords sufficient grounds for
ANNUAL REPORT 64.
Ombudsman Act § 6.

221955
23
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the institution of an inquiry.24 This provision is augmented by article 7 of the Regulations which states that "if the Ombudsman finds
that a complaint . . . is without foundation or that the subject mat-

ter of the complaint is quite immaterial, he shall as soon as possible
inform the complainant that he finds no reason to take any action in
the matter." This provision has gained great importance as the
office of the Ombudsman has developed. In 1958 and 1959, where
the reports contain information on the subject, 249 and 253 cases,
respectively, were shelved pursuant to that provision. The purpose
of the provision is to provide the Ombudsman with a device to keep
the number of cases at a practicable level and to permit him to concentrate on important problems, disregarding the trivial cases.
Conversely, the rules governing the form of the complaint and
the time-limit for appeal are not binding on the Ombudsman. A faulty
complaint may be sufficient to induce the Ombudsman to consider the
problem presented on his own initiative. And, while many complaints
are not considered because of the expiration of the one year limit, it
is not unusual for the Ombudsman to take up matters dating back
more than one year if they are connected with more recent events or
if they are of particular importance.
Scope of the Inquiry
On the whole, the legal relationship between the complaint of
a party, the issue of the case, and the substance of the decision customary in court proceedings and administrative appeals is of little importance to the consideration of a case by the Ombudsman. It is
quite usual for the original complaint to become subordinated to a
detailed inquiry into a problem of general consequence. For example,
a taxpayer's complaint that a tax question which he had raised had
not been answered in the course of two and a half years gave rise to
an extensive investigation of the handling of complaints by the highest
administrative tax court-an investigation which extended to the
basic organization of that court. 5 On occasion, cases are even discussed in the reports without any statement of the complaint which
brought about the original investigation. A typical example is found
in the 1957 Report, where the text begins, "in the consideration of a
case, I became aware

.

.

.

,"
26

and continues with the exposition of an

On the whole, at least in the cases pubimportant general problem.
lished in the reports, the Ombudsman has shown a definite inclina24

See statistics on the Ombudsman's exercise of this discretion in note 14 supra

and accompanying text.

25 1955 ANNuAL REPORT
261957 ANNUAL

69.

REPORT 198.
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tion to attach more importance to the future general consequences of
each investigation than to the effect on the particular parties involved
in the complaint which started the investigation.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
As previously mentioned, Danish law provides citizens with a
general right to bring decisions of subordinate government authorities before higher authorities, the ultimate agency of appeal normally
being the competent minister or an administrative tribunal. This
raises the question whether a dissatisfied citizen must exhaust these
administrative remedies before approaching the Ombudsman. Originally, the Ombudsman Act was silent on this point. The Regulations,
on the other hand, contained a vague provision which was interpreted
to mean that administrative remedies had to be exhausted only where
the right of appeal was to an administrative tribunal or to some other
In practice, however, the Omspecially provided appellate body."
against subordinate authorities
complaints
referred
usually
budsman
to their superiors.
In 1959 section 6 of the Ombudsman Act was amended to prohibit the lodging of complaints with the Ombudsman against any
decision still subject to variation by a higher administrative authority.2 8 The principle underlying this amendment was that, as a general
rule, the Ombudsman should take up a case only after a dissatisfied
citizen has been unable to obtain redress through administrative appeal. However, this rule is subject to two major exceptions. First,
notwithstanding the new provision, the Ombudsman may take
up the conduct of a subordinate agency on his own initiative at any
time, without waiting for resort to administrative remedies by the
victims of the possible administrative abuse. Second, the right of
appeal to the Ombudsman does not depend upon the exhaustion of
administrative remedies when the complaint is against the faulty
handling of a citizen's business with a government agency rather than
the substance of the agency's decision. The idea is that administrative
superiors are the proper organs initially to determine the substantive
law within their spheres of competence, whereas the Ombudsman should
be able to investigate allegedly improper conduct of subordinate officials
at any time. Since the latest available report relates to the year in
which the amendment came into force, it is impossible to determine
the practical effect of this change in the jurisdictional requirements for
complaints to the Ombudsman.
27 Regulations, art. 7(2).
28 Act No. 205 of June 11, 1959, Lov om endring i lov om folketingets ombuds-

mand.
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Relation to the Courts
Since many of the complaints lodged with the Ombudsman might
have been brought before the courts-and, in fact, may be brought
before them later-the relationship of the Ombudsman to the courts
raises problems similar to those concerning the exhaustion of administrative remedies. However, this field has not been regulated by
Parliament and hence can be understood only through an examination
of actual practice which, while it may not yet be fully crystalized, has
resulted in the development of certain broad lines of policy. Thus, when
a case has already been brought before a court, the Ombudsman has
refused to consider any complaint bearing on the same question. When
the complaint lodged with the Ombudsman has related to matters
which, in the case of a lawsuit, would clearly not result in the
invalidation of the decision or in an award of damages to the
complainant, the Ombudsman has been willing to consider the case
and give his opinion without reservation. This has been the treatment particularly of complaints about rather trivial formal mistakes,
dilatory procedures, slackness, rudeness, silence in the face of inquiries, and similar faults. When, on the other hand, the Ombudsman's investigation has revealed defects in the substance of the administrative decision or formal mistakes likely to result in the invalidation
of the decision, he has been inclined to express his opinion but to add
that the final decision rests with the courts; in some cases of this sort
he has even promised to recommend free legal aid to the complainants.
29
In
Quite a number of examples of this approach are given below.
summary, the opportunity of going to the courts instead of to the
Ombudsman, or of going to the courts at a later time, has not prevented the Ombudsman from considering a complaint on its merits;
but judicial review has been held out as an alternative remedy in
graver cases.
Conduct of Inquiries
Procedure before the Ombudsman is subject to few rules. Section 7(3) of the Ombudsman Act provides that the Ombudsman should
inform the person or agency about which a complaint is registered
as soon as possible after the decision to consider the complaint on the
merits has been made, unless this action is absolutely incompatible
with an investigation of the matter.
While no form of hearing before the Ombudsman or his staff is
prescribed, the inquiry is normally conducted in writing and with
little formality. At the same time, informal personal interviews with
29 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 43, 44, and 49 infra.
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the parties perform a very important part in the Ombudsman's investigations, and the wise use of this technique has contributed
greatly to the good will which the office has generated. The present
Ombudsman considers it particularly important that complainants, who
usually lack legal assistance, be afforded the opportunity for personal
interviews with him. Similarly, both parties are given a chance to
present their arguments in much greater detail than is required by
the statute; as a matter of course full argument is heard, and the evidence of one party is often submitted to the other in order to isolate
the facts on which the Ombudsman's decision is requested.
All persons are required to supply any information requested by
the Ombudsman for use in his inquiries. However, this duty is subject to the same qualifications which apply to the duty to give evidence
before the ordinary courts. The obligation to supply information to the
Ombudsman is not subject to separate sanctions; but recalcitrant
witnesses may be summoned before a court in order that the Ombudsman may obtain information under oath on any matter relevant
to his investigation.3
While these provisions do not empower the Ombudsman to
request information from public authorities without limits, in practice
there have been no difficulties in this respect. The Ombudsman has
always received whatever information he has requested from the central
government authorities and has never had to require production
of witnesses in court. In fact, the government departments collect
much of the information needed by the Ombudsman. Often the Ombudsman will submit a complaint to the government department concerned, which then provides full particulars on the matter, usually
accompanied by a detailed statement from the department.
SANCTIONS

By traditional legal standards, the range of sanctions available
to the Ombudsman is remarkably small. Even if the Ombudsman
finds that an unlawful decision has been made or that an error has
been committed in the handling of a case, he cannot himself vary the
decision of the administrative agency, nor may he order the agency to
change its decision, remand the case for reconsideration by the agency,
award damages to a complainant, or impose any penalty on the civil
servant who has been at fault. Thus, of the traditional legal sanctions, only two are available to the Ombudsman: he may order the
public authorities to institute criminal proceedings and may direct an
administrative agency to begin disciplinary action against a civil
so Ombudsman Act § 7.
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servant3 1 However, during the years covered by the published reports, neither of these sanctions has been used.
In practice, the Ombudsman has relied on the third sanction
available to him by statute, a sanction peculiar to his office. For, in
addition to the two unused traditional sanctions, the Ombudsman Act
provides that the Ombudsman may "state his view of the case." 2
This treatment of cases has permitted the Ombudsman great flexibility
in meeting the needs of particular situations. Thus he may merely
inform the parties of his view of the case; and, where his investigation
has revealed faults of major importance, the Ombudsman must inform
Parliament and the competent minister of his findings and conclusions.3 3 Finally, by including a case in his annual report, the Ombudsman may give special weight to his statement.34 These reports, which
contain from fifty to one hundred cases per volume, receive a great deal
of attention, not only from the government but also from the public
press. In stating his views of cases the Ombudsman appears to have
developed a scale of forms ranging from such expressions as "it would
have been more appropriate if
." to "I must consider it highly
criticizable that . .. ."
To some extent the Ombudsman has gone beyond the mere statement of his view of a case. Thus in some opinions the Ombudsman
has suggested that an administrative agency redress an injury. And, in
accordance with section 7(3) of the Regulations, it is usual for him
to recommend that a citizen be granted free legal aid for any action
that he may wish to bring against the state in consequence of the fault
committed. Such recommendations have always been followed by the
competent authorities.
RECOmmENDATIONS

An important result of the Ombudsman's investigations goes beyond the decision of actual cases. The Regulations require the Ombudsman to acquaint Parliament and the competent minister with
cases which he feels reveal inadequacies in existing laws and regulations, 35 and he may propose such measures as he deems useful to
Such
promote law and order or to improve government services."
3

1 Ombudsman Act § 9.
82 Ibid.
33

Ombudsman Act § 10.

34

The requirement of an annual report is set down in Ombudsman Act § 10.
85 Regulations, art. 11.
38 Ibid.
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proposals may be made even when there is no ground for criticism of
the conduct involved in a particular case. While this power to make
recommendations has been used largely in connection with his inquiries into actual cases, it contributes to the tendency of the Ombudsman to lay emphasis on the general problems raised by a case and the
future consequences of his decision rather than on the specific fault
which was the subject matter of the complaint. This tendency has
been discussed above, but it is deserving of further illustration by two
rather typical cases. The 1957 Report contains the case of a psychopathic prisoner who complained that he had been given no opportunity
to see the medical officers of the prison. The investigation showed that
this was the result of a shortage of medical officers at the institution.
While the Ombudsman said that the prisoner ought to have been taken
to a medical officer more promptly, he laid greater emphasis on a
recommendation to the ministry to consider increasing the number of
medical officers at the prison.3 7 The same report contains the case
of a woman who complained that she had been handcuffed in her
commitment to a police station. Although the Ombudsman had no
objection to the use of handcuffs in the particular case, he gave a detailed and categorical opinion setting forth general rules for the use
of handcuffs, because his investigation had revealed that there was
some uncertainty as to when they might be used. 8
RULES OF DECISION

According to section 5 of the Ombudsman Act, "the Ombudsman
shall see whether any person coming within his sphere of authority
commits any faults or acts of negligence in the discharge of his duties."
Article 3 of the Regulations amplifies this provision by extending
"fault" to include "any improper purpose" and "arbitrary or unreasonable decisions." Thus there is no precise statutory definition of
what conduct by the government services the Ombudsman may find
open to criticism, since the language used in the statute has no fixed
meaning in Danish administrative law. One thing that may be inferred from these rules with certainty is that the Ombudsman, unlike
the courts, is not required to base his judgments solely on legal considerations; rather, he may include in his opinions more discretionary
reflections on the justification and expediency of the conduct of administrative agencies, without having to disguise them in the garb
of traditional legal analysis.
37 1957 ANNUAL
38 1957 ANNuAL

REPORT

REPoRT

177.
195.
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Information as to the actual principles on which the Ombudsman
bases his judgments must therefore be gleaned from the reports. By
way of introduction, it should be emphasized that the office of Ombudsman is of very recent origin and that the published material is
still on a very modest scale. The picture provided here may therefore,
without the author's intention, be false; and quite possibly it will
change in the course of time.
Legal Principles
In his judgment of the blameworthiness of particular conduct on
the part of an administrative agency, the Ombudsman looks first of all
to the legal principles on which the judicial control of the administrative process rests. Court practice and legal literature have defined a
number of defects which will invalidate an administrative decision.
These so-called grounds of nullity are also used by the Ombudsman
in reaching his decisions.
Scope of the Agency's Delegated Authority
It is a fundamental principle of Danish administrative law that
if the acts of administrative agencies are to have the force of law, they
must be within the delegated authority of the agency. The Ombudsman has applied this principle in a rather small but important category
of cases. Among these are the rare cases in which the Ombudsman
has actually supervised the delegated legislative power. It is beyond
doubt that the Ombudsman has applied the same standard in these cases
as do the ordinary courts to determine the degree of authority required.
A few important examples deserve discussion here. In some instances,
the Ombudsman has stated that he found the questioned authority sufficient. For example, in the 1955 Report, the Ombudsman stated that
a minister had had the necessary authority under a statute on local
taxation to permit the imposition of especially high taxes in a local
government area.3 9 The next year he found that there was adequate
authority for certain rules issued by the Ministry of Agriculture govThe Ombudserning the control of various agricultural products 0
man's attitude has been equally clear in cases in which the necessary
authority has been found absent. In his 1958 Report he said that a particular agency had had no authority to refuse to assist a divorc6e in
recovering maintenance from her former husband; he recommended that
action be taken to recover the maintenance. 4 Very often, however, ques89 1955 AxNuAL REPORT 80.
40 1956 AmwtuAI. REPORT 33.
41 1958 ANNuAL REPORT 145.
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tions of the adequacy of authority are very close; in such cases the Ombudsman has maintained an attitude of prudence. In some of these cases
he has given detailed accounts of the arguments on both sides of a
question and has concluded by saying that he was undecided on the
issue of authority.'
Sometimes he has added that the final decision
was within the jurisdiction of the courts,43 and once he even said that
a judicial determination of the matter would be desirable and suggested
that he would recommend free legal aid if the complainant sought such
a decision. 4 On the other hand, the 1956 Report contains a case
in which the Ombudsman recommended that the Minister of Agriculture propose an amendment to the act in question so as to render
the authority indisputable.4 5 A somewhat similar result is found in
a case included in the 1959 Report concerning regulations issued by
the police against certain forms of advertising flying over greater
Copenhagen. The Ombudsman found the authority of the police to
issue such regulations doubtful, adding that the final decision came
within the jurisdiction of the courts. However, since he found that
steps had been taken to render the authority indisputable, the Ombudsman stated that there was no ground for taking any further
46
action.
The difference in wording of various opinions of the Ombudsman
depends in some measure on the individual circumstances of the cases
reported, but it is justifiable to assume that the difference may also
reflect greater or lesser doubt about the adequacy of the legal authority. The special treatment of the last two cases may also be due
to the fact that the rules were actually considered beneficial to society.
The importance of this factor, and the general unwillingness of the
Ombudsman to be hypnotized by formal legal rules is illustrated by
the 1958 case in which an agreement with a health insurance society
concerning the insurance of some prisoners was not criticized,
despite the doubtfulness of its conformity with the relevant statute, because, inter alia, the arrangement provided by the agreement was felt
to be expedient and beneficial to the prisoners.4 7
42
See the cases concerning the propriety of charging for a certain sort of instruction in municipal schools where general education is free, 1956 ANNUAL REPORT 201,
concerning the statutory authority for certain regulations on export control, 1956
ANNUAL REPORT 206, and concerning the lawfulness of an administrative practice
relating to another export regulation, 1958 ANNUAL REPORT 230.
4E.g.,
the school case and the 1958 export practice case, supra note 42.
44
E.g., the 1958 export practice case, 1958 ANNUAL REPORT 230, supra note 42.
45 1956 ANNUAL REPORT 206.
461959 ANNUAL REPORT 52.

47 1958 ANNUAL REPORT 80.
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Other Legal Principles
Of the other grounds of nullity, mention should be made of improper purpose, ddtournement de pouvoir, and arbitary or unequal administration, which are expressly listed in article 3(1) of the Regulations. These grounds are common to the practice of the courts and
the Ombudsman, but they take on a somewhat different meaning in
the practice of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman cannot vary or
annul any administrative decision. Consequently, unlike the courts, he
need not embark upon a complicated consideration of whether a defect
is important enough to entail invalidity. Rather, the Ombudsman
may criticize any misconduct by a government agent, regardless of its
triviality; therefore, he may criticize an improper purpose of subordinate importance, whereas the courts may invalidate a decision only
where the improper purpose was the dominant purpose.
Cases in which the Ombudsman investigates allegations of improper purpose are rather common. For example, in 1955 the Ombudsman found that a decision to refuse permission to keep a kiosk
open after the usual hours was not criticizable, but he said that it was
improper to support the decision by reference to the unsightliness of
the kiosk and its competitive advantage, since these considerations were
outside the purpose to be pursued in administering the statute conThree years later, the Ombudsman was faced with the
cerned."
question of whether the police had abused their power to assign cab
stands in order to pursue purposes contrary to the principle of competitive free enterprise. The Ombudsman considered the question
very doubtful and, since it could not be established with sufficient certainty that the chief constable had exceeded his powers, made no
criticism, adding, however, that the ultimate decision belonged to the
courts 4 9

The principle of equality plays a more important part in the
practice of the Ombudsman than in that of the courts. This is probably due to the difficulty of ascertaining with the certainty required
for a court to set aside an administrative action that two cases which
have been decided differently are in fact alike in all material respects.
Since the Ombudsman need not draw any concrete legal conclusions,
he is in a better position to invoke the principle of equality, thus contributing to the maintenance of an evenhanded attitude on the part
of civil servants, which is the main aim of that principle. Some typical
examples are found in the 1958 Report, where, in discussing a traffic
accident involving a policeman and a private citizen, the Ombudsman
48 1955 ANNUAL REPORT 19.
49 1958 ANNUAL REPoRT 242.
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said that it would have been most correct for a charge to have been
brought against the policeman as well as the private person,5 0 and
where it is stated that, on the principle of equality, the date of discharge should be the same for all conscripts who have commenced their
military service on the same day.51
New Standards of Conduct Imposed by the Ombudsman
In the cases discussed so far, the Ombudsman accepted and applied traditional rules of administrative law, subject to certain special
conditions peculiar to his position; that is to say, he contributed
to the enforcement of existing rules rather than to the establishment
of new ones. However, there are cases in which the Ombudsman's
practice shows a clear tendency to make new demands on the administrative agencies in their conduct toward citizens. This tendency is
particularly pronounced in requirements that an administrative agency
provide information to citizens on matters which concern them. In
this field, the courts have been reluctant to go beyond the enforcement
of rather modest statutory requirements, whereas the Ombudsman
seems to be developing a higher standard of conduct for administrative
agencies. For example, in Danish law it has always been assumed that
administrative agencies have no general duty to accompany their decisions with information as to how--or even whether-an appeal may
be taken. On the other hand, the Ombudsman has deliberately endeavored to introduce such a practice. The best example is found in
the 1958 Report, where it is suggested that information about appeals
be given in letters announcing decisions under the Industrial Injuries
Insurance Act.52 In support of his recommendation, the Ombudsman
cited isolated statutory provisions from other fields of law, sporadic
administrative practice, and a number of his own earlier decisions.
He concluded from these that it is "in conformity with good administrative practice that citizens be given information and guidance to the
widest possible extent in regard to any existing facilities of appeal."
Since this conclusion was based principally on prior opinions of the
Ombudsman, and since neither analogous legal provisions nor sporadic
administrative practice create such legal duties, it is evident that the
Ombudsman was intentionally creating a new legal standard.
The Ombudsman has also sought to improve the administrative
process by encouraging the publication of general rules, even where
these do not come within the categories of rules which the law requires
50 1958 ANNUAL REPORT 213.
51 1958 ANNuAL REPORT 60.
521958 ANuAL REPoRT 40.
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to be published. In the course of time, he has been instrumental
in prompting the publication of a number of standing orders of administrative tribunals.
Less sharp in outline, but plain enough in tendency, is the Ombudsman's effort to establish what might be called a duty to keep
citizens informed and a related duty to reply to citizens' requests for
information. This duty is not limited to communicating the final
decisions of cases and answering direct requests for information; the
Ombudsman has stated that citizens should also be told why their
cases are progressing slowly or that their cases have been transferred
to another authority, and that agencies should acknowledge reminders
from citizens who have not yet been informed as to the outcome of
their cases. A few examples will suffice to illustrate this tendency.
In his 1956 Report, the Ombudsman said that, in his opinion, an
authority should have informed the person concerned, on receipt
of a reminder, that the decision of his case had been stayed owing to
considerations of principle.53 In the same report, it is said that an
agency should have given some explanation to a citizen who repeatedly inquired why his case was being handled so slowly. 4 In
his 1955 Report, the Ombudsman recommended that the Director of
Public Prosecution consider making it a practice to inform persons
reporting an offense of any action taken by the police or the courts. 5
And in a more recent report, the Ombudsman contributed to the
introduction of the practice of giving notice to a divorced father when
his child obtains permission to bear the name of a stepfather.5" Finally,
in his 1956 Report, the Ombudsman criticized the Ministry of Defense
for permitting four months to elapse between deciding not to extend a
certain branch of defense and communicating this decision to persons
57
who were undergoing training for employment in that branch.
Since the Ombudsman finds it so important that citizens receive
the kinds of information discussed above, it is not surprising that he
has criticized any contravention of the statutory provisions which
require agencies to give reasoned decisions or guarantee a citizen's
right to be heard before his case is decided. There is even a tendency,
as yet but faintly defined, to raise the standards of administrative
agencies in these respects.
Another field in which the Ombudsman has shown a tendency
to raise the demands on administrative agencies relates to the rules
53 1956 A

uAL REPoRT 177.

541d. at 211.

55 1955 AN-UAL REPORT 99.
561959 ANNUAL REPORT 41.
57 1956 ANNUAL REPORT

69.
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governing bias on the part of public servants. In Denmark, as elsewhere, these rules are far from unambiguous-there are few judicial
decisions, statutory provisions are sporadic and vague, and administrative practice is not only uncertain, but is also generally concealed from
the public. In the light of this background, the Ombudsman has been
reluctant to criticize administrative actions in particular cases, but he
has been anxious to elucidate and regularize future administrative
practice. For example, in several cases the Ombudsman has recommended an amendment of the rules governing the composition of certain administrative appeal boards so as to exclude persons who have
taken part in the decision of a case in the first instance.58 And in a
much-discussed case in the 1958 Report relating to a professor's conduct in connection with the appraisal of his son-in-law's thesis, the
Ombudsman recommended that members of the various academic
assemblies vacate their seats when questions in which they may have
a personal interest are to be discussed.59 The case revealed that no
such rules existed and that practice varied, but the Ombudsman's recommendation resulted in the introduction of fixed rules governing bias.
Review of Discretion
One particularly vexing question remains concerning the Ombudsman's rules of decision. Admitting that the Ombudsman has
created rules of conduct in areas where there were previously no legal
standards, has he also fully exercised his power to criticize administrative decisions in matters which are entrusted to the unfettered discretion
of government agencies? The difficulty of answering this question
is compounded by the fact that the concept of discretion, when used
to limit the extent of judicial review of administrative decisions, is
uncertain and vague. In considering a statement by the Ombudsman,
it is difficult to say whether the courts would have reviewed the same
question to the same or to a lesser extent. Also, the Ombudsman's
practice in this field is not yet established with clarity or finality. However, there are a few general statements in the reports which give
evidence of a certain reluctance to review discretionary decisions.
In the 1956 Report, the Ombudsman stated that "in fields where
the civil servant concerned has discretionary power, I am confined to
criticizing instances which must be characterized as arbitrary or unreasonable," citing article 3(1) of the Regulations in support of his
opinion.60 In the 1958 Report, he concluded that the same Regulation
58 1958 ANNUAL REPORT 178; 1957 ANUAL REPORT 63; 1956 ANNUAL REPORT

196.
591958 AxuAL REPORT 116.
601956 ANwNuAL REPORT 118.
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"has been so written as to limit the Ombudsman's authority to criticize the discretionary decisions of government departments to those
which are patently arbitrary or unreasonable." 61 His attitude in a
number of individual cases is in accord with these general statements.
For example, the Ombudsman has been very cautious concerning both
judgments based on expert knowledge, as in the field of medicine,
and decisions of the public prosecution as to whether an offense should
be prosecuted. Of more isolated examples, mention may be made
of a 1955 case in which the Ombudsman declined to express any
opinion as to the justification for refusing to commission certain
cadets who had sought instruction from a former Danish officer who
fought for Germany in World War HI,62 and a 1957 case in which
the Ombudsman said he could not criticize the judgment underlying
the imposition of disciplinary penalties on a group of conscripts.6 3
On the other hand, in a few cases the Ombudsman has clearly
carried his review much further than the courts would have. An evident example is found where the Ombudsman expressed his opinion in
unambiguous terms concerning the dismissal of a particular civil
servant, who, it should be noted, was liable under Danish law to dismissal at any time within the discretion of his appointing authority."
In the main, it is clear that the Ombudsman has not fully utilized
his power to review the discretionary decisions of administrative
agencies. And it is doubtful, I think, that this power will ever be
used in any large measure. Where a decision is really discretionary,
so that it cannot be inferred from general legal principles and one
decision may be as justifiable as another, it is difficult for any authority, particularly for one which is outside the public administration and
lacks expert knowledge in many fields, to make an exhaustive review.
Fault and Negligence
The preceding account of the Danish Ombudsman's rules of decision has been aimed primarily at giving an idea of basic legal
principles, since these principles are of the greatest importance for the
future and of the greatest interest to members of the legal profession,
particularly those outside of Denmark. However, it would be remiss
not to include some mention of the large number of cases in which the
Ombudsman has had to deal with allegations of much more tangible
faults which come within the scope of "faults and acts of negligence"
61 1958 ANNUAL REPORT 16.
62 1955 ANNUAL REPORT 54.
631957 ANNUAL REPORT 186.
641956 ANNUAL REPORT

40.
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under section 5 of the Ombudsman Act. These cases deal with complaints relating to such matters as unreasonably slow handling of business, mislaying of files, slackness, forgetfulness, or lack of care in the
consideration of cases, inconsiderateness or direct rudeness of personal
conduct toward citizens, and like matters. Such cases are of little
interest individually; everyone concerned with the government realizes
that they are bound to happen now and again, but that steps should
be taken to avoid them. However, the prospect of the Ombudsman's
criticism in the more serious cases is likely to increase attention to
the proper standards of conduct and thus reduce the number of such
faults. While this category of cases covers a broad range, a few
examples from the reports will serve to illustrate the scope of the
Ombudsman's activities. Thus, a male nurse who struck a mental
patient was found to have committed a serious offense; ', administrative agencies have been criticized for failure to correct misinformation
given to citizens about the future handling of their cases; " an agency
was found to have failed to issue a certificate through forgetfulness; "
and another was held responsible for having given incorrect information to the tax authorities concerning the payment of wages to an
employee."8 In these last two cases, the agency had admitted the
fault, regretted it, and, insofar as possible, corrected it; therefore,
the Ombudsman found no reason to take any further action-quite a
usual conclusion to cases of admitted faults.
PUBLIC SCANDALS

One final aspect of the Ombudsman's activities should be added.
In any community, incidents which in themselves are of no fundamental significance develop into public affairs or scandals which,
through the press, attract a keen public interest, arouse passions-or
at least curiosity-and give rise to mutual public defilement of the
parties concerned. In several cases, where such affairs have come
within the sphere of his authority, they have been submitted to the
Ombudsman or taken up for investigation by him on his own initiative.
Examples of the more notorious of these include a case pertaining to
a number of mutual allegations among teachers and research workers
at the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural College as to improper procedures used for the evaluation of a thesis submitted by a candidate for
a degree; 69 another case relating to charges that a professor at the
65 1955 ANNUAL REPORT 79.
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ANNUAL
68 1955 ANNUAL
69 1955 ANNUAL
66
67

REPORT 162;
REPORT 21.
REPORT 26.
REPORT 105.
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The details of the case are discussed in Hurwitz,
Dennmark's Ombu-dsmand: The Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil and Military
Government Administration, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 169, 186-87.
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University of Copenhagen, who was also president of the university,
had favored his son-in-law; 70 an acrimonious dispute between the
personnel and the curator of a museum about the curator's use of
museum property and labor for his private purposes; 7'1 and a final
case in which there was an attempt to fix the blame for the fact that
a diplomat who committed espionage because of messy financial circumstances had not been discharged long ago for his financial imbroglios. 2 In such cases the Ombudsman's activities assume a special
character. In each, his main business has been to get to the bottom
of the case, to segregate the core of truth from the exaggerations and
controversy, and to try to put an end to the affair. In most cases he
has been successful, and his recommendations have often resulted in
new regulations and procedures designed to prevent the recurrence of
such episodes.
CONCLUSION

It is the general consensus in Denmark that the control exercised
by the Ombudsman during the past six years has been satisfactory.
Civil servants, who had raised a strong protest through their organizations against the introduction of the institution, now appear to have
accepted it, and the Ombudsman has established good personal relations with the highest administrative officials. It is also obvious that
the institution commands remarkable confidence in Parliament, with
the press, and, so far as can be ascertained, among the populace. A
large factor in this success has been the personal qualities of the present Ombudsman, who is cut out for the post to an exceptional degree.
In addition, the institution has won support from the fact that it has
been capable of combining an inclination toward the citizen's point of
view with a great understanding for the conditions of administrative
work.
The Ombudsman's investigations have not revealed any serious
flaws in Danish public administration-no cases of gross political
abuse, pronounced favoritism, corruption, or consistent slackness have
been reported. As is noted above,"8 the majority of the cases considered on their merits have afforded no grounds for criticism, and the
faults criticized, however objectionable they may have been, have not
70 1958 ANNuAL REPORT 116. For a further discussion of this case, see text
accompanying note 59 supra.
71 1955 ANNUAL REPORT 33. The details of the case are discussed in Hurwitz,
supra note 69, at 185-86.
72 1959 ANNUAL REPORT 79. The details of the case are discussed in Hurwitz,
mepra note 69, at 192-93.
73 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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been of the kind likely to compromise the public administration. Indeed, it is quite possible that the easy access to the Ombudsman and
the wide publicity surrounding his inquiries have contributed to
strengthening confidence in the public administration.
CAVEAT

The fact that the office of Ombudsman has been found satisfactory
in Denmark is, of course, no evidence of its viability in other countries.
Therefore, it may be worthwhile to mention some characteristics of
Denmark which may have played a part in the success of the Ombudsman in that country so that American readers may more easily weigh
the difficulties which would face a similar institution in their nation.
Denmark is a small country, about equal to Massachusetts in population and twice as large in area. Its one major urban center contains
slightly more than twenty-five per cent of the total population; and
somewhat less than thirty-eight per cent of the population lives
in other towns or cities. The economy has evolved from mainly agricultural to mainly industrial in the course of the present century. The
great bulk of the population is homogeneous, the country is old, and the
community is politically and socially stable. Class distinctions and
income differences are less marked than in most other countries of
Western Europe, and for years the nation has pursued a levelling policy
of the sort which is now called a welfare state.
Denmark is a parliamentary democracy and has a multiparty
system, four parties holding more than seven-eighths of the seats in
the unicameral Parliament. The government is now, and has been
historically, highly centralized. Apart from the ministers, national government services have a clearly nonpolitical and professional character:
virtually all the top officials have worked their way up through the
ranks, and outside recruitment is almost unknown. The majority of
the higher officials in the civil service are graduates in law or economics. The number of government employees supervised by the
Ombudsman is difficult to determine, but of some 105,000 persons
employed by the government, a few, such as court personnel, are excluded from the Ombudsman's jurisdiction by law, and a great many
are engaged in purely clerical or manual functions which seldom give
rise to any complaints to the Ombudsman.

